
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
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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

1 March 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State


SUBJECT:

Unauthorized Disclosures

- 1. Our foreign policy continues to be undercut and our intelligence sources and methods damaged by unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
- 2. A widespread perception exists in this government that people who violate their obligation to protect classified information go unpunished. The perception is growing that nobody cares. This undermines the morale of those who do care.
- 3. We will be judged harshly by history unless we act effectively to restore discipline to the handling of sensitive information.
- 4. Most organizations in this government rarely, if ever, investigate unauthorized disclosures. The DCI Security Committee reports that during the first quarter of 1986, 22 investigations of unauthorized disclosures were initiated by CIA, 3 by NSA, and one by State with no other member of the Intelligence Community initiating investigations, although other elements of Defense, FBI and Justice could well have done so. In short, CIA and NSA, which produce most of the intelligence, make more serious efforts to curb and penalize unauthorized disclosures than do the agencies which receive intelligence and where it passes through the hands of the largest number of people.
- 5. Agencies take too long to recognize unauthorized disclosures, to report them, and to begin investigations. Better focused and more sophisticated inquiry into serious leaks is needed to revive discipline. In discussions between the Department of Justice, FBI, CIA, and NSA, there is agreement that a team of more high level, more experienced, and more specialized investigators should be established to concentrate on investigating unauthorized disclosures.
- 6. To direct and focus this, we should establish a small committee with representatives of Defense, Justice, State, NSC, CIA and NSA. It would screen unauthorized disclosures as they occur and select those where the damage is severe, the offense egregious, and the number of suspects limited enough to justify a strong investigative effort.
- 7. Procedures for authorizing and recording contacts with the media should be developed and applied as appropriate.
- 8. The essential requirement to limit continuing damage from unauthorized disclosures is to make users and handlers of classified information highly conscious that transgressions can be discovered and detected. Restoring risk to the misuse of classified information is the key to limiting it.

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William J. Casey



The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

1 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State

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William J. Casey

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

1 March 1986

Executive Registry

86-8880

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